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Introduction 
Here we explore the underlying unity of two of the concepts that we have most employed from 
Herb Simon's work, namely bounded rationality and decomposability, and how this unity 
provides the starting point for merging cognitively focused approaches to behavioral economics 
with evolutionary/institutional economics into a coherent single framework. Our interest in 
merging these programs can be traced back particularly to the formative influence of Brian 
Loasby, who first began to wrestle with both of Herb's concepts in his 1976 book Choice, 
Complexity and Ignorance and then used George Kelly's 1963 A Theory of Personality to show 
just how much the cognitive strategies that people use for dealing with a complex world are 
dependent on that world’s being at least partially decomposable. Once the two concepts were 
seen woven together at the level of the decision-maker's mind, it gradually became apparent that 
this had relevance for consumer theory, for corporate strategy, and for public policy, and that 
institutions could be seen as devices for handling bounded rationality by partitioning the world 
into separable units. In the process of extending this line of thinking, we have increasingly 
moved from a cognitive focus to a focus on structural evolution in which the path taken by 
economic systems becomes seen as being shaped by increasing decomposition in some areas and 
by increasing interconnectedness in other areas, the changing mix of which affects the ability of 
decision makers to manage the system and its flexibility in the face of shocks. To solve 
problems, hybridization of modular elements is commonly employed, adding to the menu of 
elements on which further creative destruction may be founded. 
To explore the unity of these key concepts, and to illustrate the workings of a process of 
creative hybridization, we adopt a rather reflexive, and reflective, strategy, showing how our 
ideas developed with a blinkered focus on particular areas of the economic system considered 
separately before evolving a general system for making sense of the whole. It will become 
apparent that this is not simply our story of how Herb’s work opened up a lifetime of research 
opportunities for us, but also a reflection of Herb’s influence on Neil Kay, whose own Simon-
inspired work has been a major ingredient of our research program. 
Starting point: The UK De-Industrialization Problem 1975–1979 
The point of view that we have reached is heavily inspired by the contexts in which we originally 
encountered Simon’s work. Earl’s first encounter with Simon (1959) and the idea of satisficing 
came as a Cambridge undergraduate via his tutor Ajit Singh, who subsequently prodded him 
further down the behavioral road by encouraging him to read Janos Kornai’s Anti-Equilibrium 
(1971), a book that presents a very Simon-influenced view of the process of structural change in 
economic systems. These early encounters occurred at a time (1975–1977) when the de-
industrialization of the UK in the face of competition from Europe and Japan was a major focus. 
Within the de- industrialization phenomenon lay a puzzle for satisficing theory to resolve: Why 
did successive major falls in the value of the pound fail to induce more UK consumers to 
substitute back in favor of locally produced items and away from higher-quality, waiting- list-free 
imported products?  
The poor standards of UK products might well be accounted for in terms of low 
aspiration levels on the part of UK firms, and poor labour relations might reflect the inability of 
boundedly rational managers to see a better way to interact with their workforces. Likewise, the 
willingness of UK consumers to turn elsewhere might well reflect the discovery of overseas 
offerings when strikes or over-zealous demand expansion led to shortages of domestic products. 
(See Mosley 1976 for a satisficing analysis of demand management.) But the emerging 
discussion of the importance of “non-price factors in international trade” seemed to imply 
something about the choice process that no one was articulating explicitly: the inapplicability of 
the axiom of gross substitution. It was as if, as was sometimes said in monetary theory lectures, 
there could “breaks in the chain of substitution”, but since no alternatives to indifference analysis 
seemed to be on offer, Earl lacked a way of making sense of links between non-price factors and 
demand inelasticity. 
In commencing his PhD studies at Cambridge in 1977, Earl began with a broad vision of 
the workings of economies that combined cumulative causation and multiplier ideas from 
Myrdal and Keynes with a mixture of Simon/Kornai satisficing/threshold-of-adjustment ideas 
and Leijonhufvud’s (1969, 1973) thinking in terms of liquidity buffers and corridors of stability 
within which orderly adjustment might normally occur. This was colored by acceptance of 
Shackle’s (1967) emphasis on the scope for surprise and the difficulties of foreknowing the 
future, which seemed to complement Simon’s notion of bounded rationality. Also on the agenda 
at this early stage was the idea that some decision makers might be resistant to changing their 
behaviour in the face of changing external conditions, something that March and Simon (1958) 
explored at length in the organizational setting and which also seemed rather to apply to 
mainstream economists in the face of criticism from behavioralists. First on the list of books to 
read was Brian Loasby’s Choice, Complexity and Ignorance (1976), which swiftly reinforced the 
idea that a synthesis of Simon and Shackle was in order. This book introduced Earl to Simon’s 
(1962, 1969) notion of decomposability and pointed him in the direction of seeing that Kuhnian 
paradigms or Lakatosian research programs might be useful concepts for understanding how 
people in general, and not merely scientists, cope with bounded rationality. Having found it 
impossible to find a supervisor in Cambridge who was both available and interested in 
behavioral economics, and with a lectureship offer from Stirling University in Scotland, Earl 
headed north to work with Loasby, who agreed to serve as an external PhD supervisor.  
 
The “Stirling School.” 1979–1984 
Initially the question of whether or not an economic system was decomposable did not seem to 
be linked to the concept of bounded rationality. Rather, its significance seemed to relate to the 
scope for economic crises to occur. First, there was the question of the long-run environmental 
impact of human actions. Long before discovering Simon’s work, Earl had read “A Sound of 
Thunder”, Ray Bradbury’s science fiction tale of time-traveling dinosaur hunters. This fable 
opened up major questions about path dependence and the scope for “small” actions to have 
major implications in interconnected systems over the long term. One way that “small” actions 
might have small consequences was via the system’s having some kind of slack/buffering in it, 
such that any shockwaves would normally dissipate. Simon offered a different perspective: the 
overall system might be composed of modules such that spillover effects only operated within a 
well-defined area, rather as if confined to islands. He also argued that processes of evolution 
would tend to select modular systems precisely because of their resilience in the face of 
disturbances. But if we could take the “island” notion only as a short run approximation, scope 
for long-term ecological crisis seemed considerable. The fate of wildlife on islands to which 
predators were introduced indicated the hazards of specialization when a subsystem was not 
actually closed in the long run. 
 The idea that small changes might have dramatic long-term implications in systems with 
limited decomposability seemed to link with bounded rationality in that the system might be 
impossible for mere mortals to fathom, Already, possible links with what we now would call 
chaos theory were being hinted at by Conrad Waddington in his provocative 1977 book Tools for 
Thought.  Earl began to feel that for understanding whether one could get away with non-
historical, partial-equilibrium analysis, it would be essential to understand the extent of 
decomposability and how one event might lead to another. This theme has underlain our 
subsequent thinking on topics as diverse as buyer–seller chains in housing markets (Earl 1995, 
1998) and browsing behavior in shopping malls (Earl and Potts 2000). 
 A second line of thinking came from having read Piero Sraffa’s Production of 
Commodities by Means of Commodities (1960), which had introduced the notion of the “basic 
commodity”, one that figures directly or indirectly, via the matrix of production, in the 
production of all items in the system. At the time of Earl’s arrival at the University of Stirling 
(1979) the second OPEC oil shock had just been engineered, and despite Brian Loasby’s 
commenting during a seminar that he could not think of any examples of a basic commodity, oil 
seemed a near enough fit to the basic commodity idea. That a rise in the price of oil could cause 
a crisis seemed to have something to do with the sheer range of areas in which oil figures in the 
system. This is something that cannot be said for most products. For some products (say, sheet 
music of works by avant-garde composers), consumption and patterns of influence would be 
restricted to a very select circle. However, modern marketing techniques are increasingly 
recomposing the boundaries between products via complementary “product tie- ins” that generate 
and feed from brand ubiquity. This seems to produce highly skewed purchasing behavior 
compared with that which was observed in the much more decomposable consumer markets of 
not so long ago. (At the time of writing, Christmas 2001, Harry Potter is everywhere, with Lord 
of the Rings waiting in the wings.) There is much research waiting to be done linking bounded 
rationality’s role in the significance of easily recognizable brands and superstars (Rosen, 1981) 
to the managerial and industrial organization implications of the need to coordinate 
complementary activities aimed at capturing rents, quite often within short product life cycles. 
Earl’s first discussion of the significance of whether or not economic systems were 
decomposable was in the context of an analysis (in Dow and Earl 1982, pp. 145-6, originally 
written late in 1980) of Hyman Minsky’s (1975) financial instability hypothesis. Minsky’s 
analysis is based on interconnected financial balance sheets and shifting populations of players 
prone to shifting moods and risk tolerances in financial markets. Not all financial crashes had the 
wide-ranging implications of the 1929 Wall Street Crash, and in the lesser disasters particular 
pockets of the economy would suffer disproportionately.  This theme was revisited rather more 
forcefully in Earl (1990), which included not only further Minskian case study work but also a 
chapter on bottlenecks and buffers that affect the stability of macroeconomic systems and the 
size of multiplier coefficients. 
A crucial lead for taking Simon’s ideas further came via Stirling alumnus Neil Kay, 
whose dissertation-based 1979 book The Innovating Firm Earl purchased a few weeks before 
moving to Stirling. Kay provided a strong critique of aggregative, “bottom-up,” reductionist 
mainstream economic analysis in the context of the allocation of resources to corporate research 
and development. In its place he offered a hierarchical, “top-down” analysis of budgeting. Kay’s 
critique of reductionism was influenced by the work of Arthur Koestler, who in his 1975 book 
The Ghost in the Machine had been an early adopter of ideas from “The Architecture of 
Complexity” (Simon 1962). Koestler had made Simon’s thinking the basis for a systems-within-
systems, Janus-faced (looking both ways) alternative to whole-based, top-down or reductionist, 
bottom-up modes of analysis. At the same time Koestler (1975b) offered an analysis of The Act 
of Creation, in which novelty entailed hitherto untried combinations of already-existing 
elements, a perspective similar to that offered by Shackle (1979) in his analysis of the 
imagination in terms of a capacity to make fresh combinations of existing alphabetic elements. 
New products could be seen as emergent systems within systems. 
Kay (1982, 1984) was quick to offer in a pair of books an analysis of the kind of view of 
economic organization implied by the Simon/Koestler perspective. In a seminar entitled 
“Diversification: Some Firms Do, Some Firms Don’t” presented at Stirling in 1981, Kay gave a 
taste of what these books would contain: a striking synthesis of Ansoff’s (1965) notion of 
synergy and Simon’s decomposability perspective. Rather than focusing on the firm’s activities 
as a set of product market involvements, he sought to reorient industrial economics to focus on 
linkages between product markets and the strategic strengths and vulnerabilities that came from 
them. Shared technologies, markets, and brand names give strength when times are good, 
enabling costs to be spread across different but related products. If the external environment 
changes as a result of new technology, government regulations, changes in fashion, and so on, 
the links become potentially dangerous: what is problematic for one product may prove 
problematic for products linked to it. Hence firms that believe themselves to be operating in 
surprise-prone environments should avoid having too many linkages between their different 
products, so that if something goes wrong and causes the unexpected truncation of a product 
lifecycle, they will still have other sources of cash flow. 
An important aspect of Kay’s 1982 book was his attempt to distinguish between system 
linkages at a point in time (synchronic) and linkages between things as time passes (diachronic): 
if a subsystem were subject to a shock, the structure of the former linkages could affect the set of 
events that then unfolded through time. In later work, Kay has increasingly looked at the 
implications of bounded rationality for industrial organization not merely in terms of 
decomposability of corporate activities but also in terms of the patterns of strategic alliances and 
networks that emerge as means of managing, simultaneously, strategic risk and the limits of what 
individual organizations can know and coordinate. (See Kay 1997) 
Earl set out to do for consumer behavior what Kay had been doing in the economics of 
industrial organization. Initially, he examined the organization of household spending in terms of 
top-down budgeting and the grouping of products into mental categories for comparison as a 
means of coping with bounded rationality. This seemed consistent with the design of real-world 
shopping environments, as with the division of supermarkets into separate sections for 
vegetables and fruit, dairy products, and so on. Simon-inspired work by James Bettman and 
others in marketing journals put Earl on to the trail of non-compensatory decision rules. These 
provided a means of making sense of consumer intolerance of products that would not meet 
particular standards, whether price (outside a budget range) or non-price factors. In other words, 
non-compensatory decision rules provided a basis for segmenting demand systems into 
approximately separate zones, where changes in one zone would have limited impacts on other 
zones. On this view, substitution in terms of price would come about because of the use of price 
as tie-breaking rule, or because a price cut repositioned a product within the budget ranges of 
buyers who previously would not have considered it; otherwise, choices would be based on 
relative abilities of products to match up with non-price standards of adequacy on consumers’ 
checklists. 
As a part of this checklist view of consumer choice, Earl developed a synthesis between 
(a) Simon’s work, (b) George Shackle’s (1979) theory of choice under non-probabilistic 
uncertainty and (c) the personal construct psychology of George Kelly (1963), to which Loasby 
had drawn his attention. Kelly’s work presumes that people cope with the world by modeling it 
as if it is, in Simon’s terms, decomposable; that they construct their view of the world in a 
hierarchical manner; and that they have limited dimensions in terms of which to see things. 
Consumers’ checklists will be of finite length, dependent on their expertise and interest in the 
particular market. Where the performance of a product is uncertain in respect of a particular 
dimension, it will be deemed acceptable if a sufficiently good outcome seems sufficiently 
plausible in prospect and an unduly bad performance seem sufficiently implausible. (This is a 
kind of four-target/two-point test, rather than a simple aspiration level of the kind they would 
employ as a filter if not uncertain.)  Earl (1983, 1984) explores these ideas were explored at 
length, with a particular focus in the latter work on how non-compensatory decision rules related 
to the UK’s de- industrialization problems.. 
The further Earl got into the clinical psychology literature associated with personal 
construct theory, the more it seemed that there were similarities with issues that Kay was raising 
in corporate strategy and that Kuhn and Lakatos had wrestled with in the philosophy of science. 
Kelly saw  most people as organizing their constructs into hierarchical systems, assigning  
determining roles to some (“core”) constructs, in much the same way that businesses assign staff 
to positions at particular levels within particular departments in order get things done and avoid 
internal chaos. By contrast, people who get into a mess tend to have a lack of linking threads to 
bind their thoughts into some kind of order, or so many threads linking cons tructs to each other 
that they cannot change one idea with producing massive change in their view of the world. For 
Kuhn and Lakatos, scientists seem to have certain key ideas, which they are very reluctant to 
change, on which they build their views of the world, and they are prepared to add in all manner 
of ad hoc notions to preserve their viewpoints if the latter seem at odds with evidence. In 
typically imposing hierarchical architectures that result in points of view that are vertically 
layered (with some ideas more to the periphery than to the core) as well as divided horizontally 
into subsystems, people are able to make the task of thinking about the world manageable. They 
also are not overwhelmed by the Duhem-Quine problem that asserts it is impossible to know 
when a particular idea is wrong because one is always testing a nested set of ideas.  
For world-views to be resilient and yet amenable to evolution, people must assign some 
firm spots on which to build their lives. They also need to segment their lives into different 
sections with limited spillover allowed between them. People who choose to build their entire 
lives around particular assumptions, such as the ongoing availability of a particular career path, 
person, or personal capability will be devastated if these are falsified. For example, when Lee 
Iacocca  lost his job at Ford, the disruption to his life was, until he was hired to revive Chrysler, 
every bit as problematic as the disruption felt by the Ford Motor Company decades before on the 
death of the Model-T, to whose production the firm had become specifically dedicated (Earl and 
Kay 1985, Earl 1986a). In a world of turbulence, people need partially decomposable ways of 
thinking and lifestyles, just as firms need to be diversified around a va riety of business themes.  
At the end of his time at Stirling (mid-1984), while finishing the final version of his PhD 
dissertation, Earl began to see inelasticity of demand and the marketing notion of consumer 
“involvement” in relation to the extent of decomposability in consumers’ world-views and/or 
lifestyles. Even if choice involved some kind of more orthodox weighing of attractive and off-
putting aspects of a product, resistance to change as price or non-price features were varied still 
seemed to be underpinned by the mental architecture people used to organize their thoughts. 
Crucial here were (i) the patterns of “implications” that particular changes were seen to entail 
and (ii) which thoughts about change were ruled out of court or unthinkable by higher- level 
constructs. Some changes are easy to make because their overall implications are limited; other 
have such dramatic negative implications that they are unthinkable (Earl 1986a, 1986b; see 
Laaksonen 1994, for a marketing perspective on involvement). On this basis, what seem from the 
standpoint of onlookers with more decomposable points of view to be “minor changes” may 
cause people with highly interconnected points of view to get very hot under the collar. 
Simon’s general vision of the mind being usefully seen as a system of computer-like 
programs increasingly became a backdrop for Earl’s thinking as he framed the nature of choice 
in the manner outlined above. There seemed to be a need for a limited set of rules that were hard-
wired at birth, that would limit the kinds of ideas that decision makers could find acceptable as a 
basis for constructing further ideas, just as particular kinds of software will only run on particular 
kinds of computers. Some people simply will not buy some things or ideas. However, the 
hierarchy of ideas that a person employs might, like a constitutional system, include self-denying 
clauses that specified the conditions under which core notions would be abandoned and a 
radically new point of view taken on board. Put it another way: the mind’s core is not simply like 
a computer operating system, but like a computer operating system that is open to upgrading in 
certain ways. 
Just before leaving Stirling for the University of Tasmania, Earl got together with Kay 
and together they mapped out their 1985 article employing many of the foregoing lines of 
thinking to argue that notions of hierarchy and decomposability provided a basis both for policy 
design and for replying to critics of subjectivist economists such as Shackle who emphasize the 
potential for kaleidic change in decision making environments. Their core notions have not 
changed significantly since then. What has changed is the appreciation of what makes this kind 
of economics both different at its core and, in consequence, its breadth of scope. This heightened 
appreciation required a shift to the other side of the planet and the passage of ten years.  
 
Complexity, and So On 
Potts began his PhD studies in 1995 at Lincoln University in New Zealand. He had been properly 
trained in neoclassical economics and therefore knew nothing of Herbert Simon or, for that 
matter, of anyone else mentioned above. But he was a great admirer of Veblen, he had, by 
chance, read Robert Pirsig’s 1991 novel Lila and Stuart Kauffman’s 1993 book Origins of Order, 
and he had dimly perceived how these ideas might apply to economics, if only economics could 
be interpreted in terms of evolutionary theory. He wanted to work on evolutionary economics, 
and with unabashed naivety he presumed, post-Veblen, he was the first to ever think of this. He 
went looking for a supervisor. Through a random search he discovered Peter Earl, whom 
someone characterized en route as the only economist in New Zealand who did “that strange sort 
of economics.” And an otherwise unlikely connection was made. 
 Potts thus was introduced to Simon by Earl, and subsequently to Loasby (1991). He 
already had a complex systems view of the nature of economic evolution in mind, and one of the 
first books he read was The Sciences of the Artificial and in particular the reprinted version of 
“The Architecture of Complexity.”  
In time, Potts’s PhD dissertation emerged as a high- level synthesis of complexity theory, 
evolutionary theory, computational theory and economic theory. It was published in 2000 as The 
New Evolutionary Microeconomics: Complexity, Competence and Adaptive Behavior.  At the 
heart of this book is the idea that an economic system is a complex system of complex systems. 
The agents are complex behavioral systems, composed of systems of decision rules, as Simon, 
Kelly and Earl had explained. Yet Potts soon realized, through reading Simon, Leijonhufvud, 
Richardson, Shackle, Loasby, and Kay, that firms, industries, and the entire macro system, 
including expectations, were also complex systems. There occurred an awakening in which the 
whole economic universe seemed to be made of complex systems and perhaps that was the key 
to a general framework. This was eventually synthesized with a graph-theoretic conception of the 
geometry of economic space (Potts 2000: chapter 2). This scheme was in direct contrast to the 
standard basis of microeconomics in field theory; instead it was based upon an ontology of 
connections and the definition of a system as a set of elements connected in specific ways. A 
complex system was defined as a structure of connections with the property of partial 
decomposition. An economic system is then a complex system of complex systems and naturally 
an emergent product of boundedly rational agents. Economic evolution is a creative and 
destructive process of the dynamics of connection within and between systems, which sometimes 
involves the emergence of new systems.  
 Potts’s graph-theoretic superstructure further illuminated the relation between bounded 
rationality, decomposability and economic evolution as a growth-of-knowledge process. 
Bounded rationality is the dual statement that economic agents use systems of rules for thinking 
and that they are only partially connected to their environment. Most connections will be local. 
Some will be global. Sometimes changes will have dramatic effects. Sometimes large changes 
will have small effects. Dynamics, in this view, depend on the geometry of connections. This is 
true at the level of the individual agent, as Earl had long realized, but it is also true throughout 
the economic system and determines its ability to evolve as a growth-of-knowledge process 
(Loasby 1999; Quine 1951). Evolution entails systems attaining and maintaining complexity 
without losing coherence (too few connections ) or freezing up (too many). This is how we both 
came to re-read Simon’s views on the architecture of complexity. But now we had a framework 
that revealed the deep relation between bounded rationality and decomposability as a story about 
the evolutionary dynamics of partial connectivity in complex systems.  
 Research opportunities abound when everything is a complex system. One project is to 
synthesize evolutionary psychology with behavioral and evolutionary economics. Interestingly, 
this project has its roots in one point where Simon was wrong. He had argued for the idea of the 
mind as a general problem solver. Although seminal to artificial intelligence research, it has been 
rejected by evolutionary psychology, which has instead championed the notion of the mind as a 
massively modular system of specialized problem solving—as indeed Simon himself might have 
portrayed it if he had seen it in terms of his work on decomposability. These mind-modules are 
adaptations to particular problems recurrent in the ancestral environment. The mind is then 
viewed as what the brain does, which is to coordinate these specialized competencies into a near-
seamless complex parallel system of cognition: Simon was not so wrong after all. Earl and Potts 
(forthcoming) argue that his concept of bounded rationality would have been much better 
appreciated if he had made a distinction between inborn preferences and learned knowledge. If 
consumers can discover how the technologies of consumption impinge on the relatively limited 
set of high- level things that they desire, choice is relatively straightforward. Even when people 
know they face dilemmas, they are capable of jumping one way rather than another as their gut 
instincts dictate. Bounded rationality thus seems only to apply to information and knowledge that 
must be learned or acquired about contents of the set of feasible choices and the different 
implications of selecting any one of these options. We have come to see that this line of thinking 
has implications for the relation between information, knowledge, markets and competence.    
 A second project is to explore the geometry of connections in economic systems, as the 
maps of associations, complementarities and in general of connections by which the whole is 
greater than the sum of the parts. At present, very little is known about the connective structure 
of an economic system. We do of course know a lot about resource flows (input–output tables) 
and spatial aspects of industry and factor markets. And we do know something about the inter-
connective structure of corporations (Kay 1997). But we know little about the geometry of 
knowledge in economic systems, and in particular the structure of specialized knowledge as an 
ecology of expertise. There are many aspects to this, such as the bundling of commodities (store 
design, menu selection, product tie- ins, and so forth) and strategies (consultancy, marketing, 
management) and also the deep structure of knowledge that connects some industries more 
closely than others. What we might hope to learn from such analysis of the connective structure 
of economic systems is not just the architecture of consumer lifestyles and organizational 
competencies but also the spaces into which entrepreneurship moves by creating and destroying 
these connections. The direction this heading is toward a new evolutionary growth theory. 
 
Post-Simon Economics in a World of Globalization 
A third research task implied by our Simon-inspired approach to economic evolution is a 
thoroughgoing exploration of the relationship between globalization, decomposability and 
bounded rationality. Our earlier comments regarding the analogy between systems of though that 
are open to change, and computer operating systems that can be upgraded, might strike some 
readers as rather similar to Thomas Friedman’s popular writing on globalization. Friedman sees 
different nations as having different rules of operation and openness to change, which determine 
their relative performance in an increasingly interconnected global economic environment. Yet 
much of the best-selling writing of Friedman and others on globalization remains questionable 
when viewed from a post-Simon standpoint. 
International labor mobility certainly becomes easier the more that firms operate in 
identical styles, lessening switching costs for boundedly rational workers and their colleagues. 
However, modern knowledge workers are often portrayed as moving in response to job 
opportunities regardless of any ties in terms of family and community links. Whether in the age 
of the Internet and cheap telecommunications such ties become much less significant is an open 
question: are virtual relationships a close substitute for “being there”? (See Simon’s Travel 
Theorem, in Simon 1991 pp. 306–7). If the ties continue to bind, the field perspective does not 
apply. 
Likewise, with search engines and other Internet services, it may be possible to obtain 
excellent advice on what to choose and where to obtain supplies at the cheapest price, from 
anywhere on the planet. Yet running against this field perspective on markets is the possibility 
that demand will become increasingly driven by web links that enable specialized cells of 
demand to operate like never before. Within them, consumers may find a bewildering array of 
appealing items between which to choose, many of which they would otherwise have had little 
chance of discovering without great effort. 
Finally, we return to the first policy area mentioned in relation to decomposability: 
financial markets. Perhaps the field conception of markets applies most strongly to the financial 
sector, at least in terms of that sector’s ability to obtain information rapidly any time, anywhere. 
However, as far as the system’s ability to operate in an orderly manner and promote real 
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